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THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN COMPLEX CIVIL
LITIGATION
This Comment examines the growing trend to strike jury de-
mands in complex commercial litigation. The first section re-
views the historical background of the seventh amendment right
to jury trial. The second section examines Ross v. Bernhard, the
leading Supreme Court precedent on the right. The writer next
explores the five recent lower court cases dealing with a motion
to strike jury demand. Finally, the writer critically evaluates the
new trend and demonstrates that Ross has been misinterpreted.
INTRODUCTION
In almost all criminal and civil trials, United States law strongly
favors trial by jury.' The seventh amendment to the United
States Constitution embodies this preference with respect to civil
actions; the amendment guarantees the right to jury trial in all
suits not of an equitable or admiralty jurisdiction.2 In the last
three years, five cases wrestled with the problem of a jury's abil-
ity to competently decide a complicated suit.3 Four of the cases
held that in extremely complex cases, juries are incompetent tri-
ers of fact and on that ground overrode the seventh amendment.4
However, one case disapproved this trend and stated that the fun-
1. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,
485-86 (1935).
2. The seventh amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
3. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224
(N.D. Ill. 1977); In ,re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal.
1977); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
4. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal.
1977); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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damental right to jury trial cannot be eroded by the complexity of
the case.5
The decision in each of these cases rested on Ross v. Bernhard,6
yet three different interpretations emerged. The Court in Ross at-
tempted to formulate a three-pronged test to aid in determining
whether an issue is legal or equitable in nature. Once the issue is
labeled legal, the right to a jury trial attaches.7 The conflicting in-
terpretations of Ross indicate that the test is not clearly under-
stood by the courts.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The prevailing view is that the institution of the jury is of conti-
nental origin and was introduced into England by the Norman
Kings as early as the eleventh century.8 However, the English de-
veloped a bifurcated system consisting of the Common Law Court
and the Court of Chancery. The procedure in Chancery differed
materially from that in the Common Law Courts; in Chancery
there was no right to a jury trial.9
Hardships and inconveniences occurred because of the bifur-
cated system of law and equity. Those suing in equity were often
dismissed because their proper remedy was at law. Parties in ac-
tions at law could not raise equitable claims or defenses. There-
fore, two suits were necessary to hear the equitable and legal
claims arising from a single transaction.10
When creating the federal court system in 1789, Congress drew
upon the English system and developed a single court system
that administered law and equity separately." The procedures
and rules in a court of equity were different from those in a court
of law.12 Furthermore, the adoption of the seventh amendment in
1791 continued the English practice of expressly allowing jury tri-
als only in suits at common law.'3
5. Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D.
Ill. 1977).
6. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
7. See text accompanying notes 20-37 infra.
8. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02, at 8.2-9 (2d ed. 1978).
9. E. MORGAN, THE STUDY OF LAW 9-13 (2d ed. 1948). See F. JAMES & G. HAZ-
ARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 1.3-.5, at 8-16 (2d ed. 1977), for an in-depth discussion of
the English development of the Court of Chancery.
10. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.5, at 15-18 (2d ed. 1977).
11. Id. (citing C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 9 (2d ed. 1947)).
12. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, % 38.08, at 79-80 (2d ed. 1978).
13. See note 2 supra. Both Blackstone and Story spoke of the right to jury
trial at common law in glowing terms. "Blackstone thought the jury to be the
'principal criterion of truth in the law of England' and the right to trial by jury to
be the 'most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy or wish for."' 5
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 38.02, at 9-10 (2d ed. 1978). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW
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The courts generally have interpreted the seventh amendment
as preserving the jury trial right that existed at common law in
England in 1791.14 The amendment addresses only suits at corn-
OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 447 (3d ed. 1976). Moore also points out that in Eng-
land today, the jury is "seldom employed in civil suits, has been abandoned in
criminal prosecutions other than for major crimes, and even there is used decreas-
ingly." 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02, at 10 (2d ed. 1978) (citing Judge
Frank in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 56 n.4 (2d Cir. 1948)).
See also F. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry? (Apr. 1976) (address delivered at The Pound Conference), reprinted in 70
F.R.D. 199, 209 (1976).
Story states, "[The seventh amendment] is a most important and valuable
amendment; and places upon the high ground of constitutional right the inestima-
ble privilege of a trial by jury in civil cases ... which is conceded by all to be es-
sential to political and civil liberty." 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02, at 10
(2d ed. 1978) (citing 3 STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION 633 (1833)).
While Holdsworth recognized some defects in the jury, he listed the following
virtues of the jury:
1. The litigant gets a body of persons who bring average common sense to
bear upon the facts of his case. 2. The findings of the jury create no prece-
dent; and thus the jury can decide hard cases equitably without making
bad law. 3. Litigants are generally contented with the measure of justice
meted out by a jury. 4. A jury helps to preserve the dignity of the bench
by relieving the judge of the responsibility of deciding simply upon his
own opinion. 5. The jury itself is educated by its participation in the ad-
ministration of justice. 6. The jury makes the law intelligible by con-
stantly bringing the rules of law to the touchstone of common sense.
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 348-50 (6th ed. 1938), cited in 5
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02, at 11-12 (2d ed. 1978).
On the other hand, Hamilton felt the use of the jury should be subject to legisla-
tive discretion rather than to the rigid dictates of the Constitution. THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 83 (A. Hamilton), cited in 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02, at 10 n.11,
38.08, at 69-71 (2d ed. 1978). A modern critic of the right to jury trial was the late
Judge Frank. He believed that use of the jury is not justified in civil litigation. J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 110-11 (1949), cited in 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.02, at 12-14 (2d ed. 1978). Various criticisms are as follows: (1) The jury gives no
reasons for its verdict; thus the verdict may reflect popular prejudice of the day.
(2) The jury is capable of intimidation. (3) Use of juries causes delay. (4) Many
jurors are incompetent triers of fact. See Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to
Jury TriaL A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L.
REV. 486, 502-08 (1975), for a discussion of the pros and cons of the civil jury and a
comprehensive listing of articles, books, and views on the subject. For the pur-
poses of this Comment, suffice it to say that the desirability and validity of juries
is an area open to great debate. However.
Despite the theoretical case against the jury and much buttressing reality,
the jury system has persisted in this country. Undoubtedly it will con-
tinue to do so for some time, because it fulfills a felt need. The jury is like
rock music. Classical theory frowns; the masses applaud. And in a de-
mocracy the felt need of the masses has a claim upon the law.
5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02, at 15 (2d ed. 1978).
14. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Slocum
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174
U.S. 1, 22-23 (1899); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830); United
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mon law. Therefore, the Supreme Court construed the amend-
ment to have no application to equity suits.15 In ascertaining the
scope of the seventh amendment, the Supreme Court applied the
"historical test," which looked to the common law rules at the
time the amendment was adopted in 1791.16
The use of the historical test became complicated by the
merger of law and equity. In 1938, the federal courts achieved the
procedural union of law and equity by adopting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.' 7 Merger allowed parties to claim both legal
and equitable issues in one lawsuit.18 The determination of what
the English practice was in 1791 was sufficiently difficult without
the additional burden of adapting that practice to the newly
merged procedures.19 As a result, the Supreme Court attempted
States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750); 5 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 38.08, at 79 (2d ed. 1978). The following is a list of the actions
traditionally believed to be actions at common law as they existed prior to 1791:
trespass to property and person, including assault, battery, and false imprison-
ment; trespass on the case, including negligence, patent, copyright, trademark in-
fringement, literary piracy, violation of antitrust acts, nuisance, fraud and deceit,
slander, libel, and malicious prosecution; trover to recover damages for conversion
of personal property; detinue and replevin for wrongful detention of personal
property; ejectment to recover possession of land; covenant to recover on a sealed
instrument; debt; general assumpsit; and special assumpsit to recover damages on
a simple contract. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11, at 118-20 (2d ed. 1978).
15. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 447 (1944); Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 253, 262 (1855). However, this principle did not preclude the application
of the seventh amendment to newly created rights of a legal nature, which would
under common law principles be enforced in a suit at common law. 5 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1138.08, at 79-80 (2d ed. 1978). Nor does the amendment apply to
suits in admiralty, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45 (1932), or to administrative
proceedings, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937).
16. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
17. FED. R. CIv. P. 1, 2.
18. Rule 18 permits a party to join as many claims, "legal, equitable, or mari-
time," as he or she has against the defendant. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Although the
rule is permissive and failure to join a claim does not bar its assertion in another
action, if the second claim is really a part of the first cause of action the rule
against splitting a single cause of action will prohibit suit on the second claim. 3A
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 18.04, at 18-13 (2d ed. 1978).
19. [Mlerger made the Seventh Amendment historical test extremely
difficult to apply when, under the broad provisions of the Federal Rules
for joinder of claims, equitable and legal remedies were sought alterna-
tively or cumulatively; or when, under the Rules' provisions for compul-
sory and permissive counterclaims, legal counterclaims were made to
equitable claims or equitable counterclaims to legal claims. In such situa-
tions, "issues formerly equitable are for the court; issues formerly legal
are normally for the jury if timely demand is made." The sequence in
which these issues are tried, however, has great importance. For if the eq-
uitable and legal issues arise out of the same transaction or occurrence,
adjudicating the equitable issues first may operate through collateral es-
toppel to prevent a jury trial of the legal issues.
Note, Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE
L.J. 112, 114-15 (1971). See also FED. R. Crv. P. 13 (counterclaims) and 18(a) (join-
der of claims).
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to unravel the problem areas on a case-by-case basis.
MODERN SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The United States Supreme Court expounded the modern view
of the seventh amendment in the trilogy of Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover,20 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,21 and Ross v. Bern-
hard.22 The Court rejected the notion that the application of the
seventh amendment compels categorization of rights and reme-
dies as legal or equitable on a rigidly historical basis. Procedural
obstacles created before the merger of law and equity will not
prevent a jury trial.23
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover24 is the seminal case limiting
the purely historical approach in defining law and equity. The
Supreme Court analyzed the problem of legal cross-claims and
counterclaims brought against the original equity claimant. The
case was an action for a declaration that certain contracts were
reasonable and were in compliance with antitrust laws. The com-
plaint also prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant
from suing until the plaintiff's action could be determined. The
defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff and a cross-
claim against an intervenor, charging a violation of the antitrust
laws. The defendant demanded a jury trial.
Justice Black, writing for the Court, conceded that prior to
merger, a court of equity could enjoin an action at law and dis-
pose of the entire case before it. A contrary rule would deprive
the equity plaintiff of an orderly disposition of the entire contro-
versy. Thus, the Beacon Theatres situation would have been
treated as a single controversy and the parties would be denied
the right to a jury trial. However, Justice Black stated that the
seventh amendment should not necessarily apply to actions
under the Federal Rules in the same manner as the pre-merger
20. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
21. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
22. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
23. See Note, Congressional Provisions for Nonjury Trials under the Seventh
Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401 (1973); Comment, From Beacon Theatres to Dairy
Queen to Ross: The Seventh Amendment, The Federal Rules, and a Receding Law-
Equity Dichotomy, 48 J. URB. L 459 (1971). For an in-depth look at Beacon Thea-
tres, see McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Bea-
con Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1967).
24. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
1007
practice. Courts must reevaluate traditional equity rules in light
of the liberal joinder provisions in the Federal Rules which allow
legal and equitable causes to be brought and resolved in one civil
suit.25 As a result, the Court in Beacon Theatres held that courts
must separate the legal and equitable claims and conduct a jury
trial on the legal issues first. As long as the action involves a legal
claim, a party has the right to a jury trial on demand.
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood26 reinforced Beacon Theatres. The
complaint sought an injunction against further use of a trade
name, an accounting to determine the exact amount owed by a li-
censee, and a judgment for the amount owed. The licensee de-
manded a jury trial on all issues. The district court denied the
request for jury trial. The court viewed the entire action as equi-
table, the damages claim being merely incidental to the main
claim. The Supreme Court reversed, pointing out that under Fed-
eral Rule 18, the parties must join the claims for money damages
with the claim for equitable injunctive relief.27 Applying Beacon
Theatres, the Court held that since the legal and equitable claims
involved common factual issues, a jury must determine the legal
claims before a final court determination of the equitable claims.28
Thus, Dairy Queen modified the test to determine whether a
complaint joins separate claims for legal and equitable relief. The
question is no longer whether prior to merger all claims would
have been disposed of by a court of equity. Rather, the test is
whether a party could bring any of the claims as actions at law.
Moreover, even if the legal claim is incidental to the equitable
claim, there is a right to a jury trial prior to court determination
on the equitable issues.
Ross v. Bernhard29 expanded Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen
by extending the seventh amendment guarantee to shareholder
derivative suits. The plaintiffs, stockholders in a closed-end in-
25. Id. at 510.
26. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
27. Id. at 471.
28. Justice Black, writing for the Court, made it plain that the decision in Bea-
con Theatres did not rest on the characterization of the complaint as primarily at
law. He statec
The holding in Beacon Theatres was that where both legal and equitable
issues are presented in a single case, "only under the most imperative cir-
cumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the
Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of le-
gal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." That
holding, of course, applies whether the trial judge chooses to characterize
the legal issues presented as "incidental" to equitable issues or not.
Id. at 472-73 (citations omitted).
29. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
1008
[VOL. 16: 1003, 19791 Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
vestment company, sued on behalf of the corporation against the
directors and investment brokers.
Until Ross,30 the courts viewed the shareholder derivative ac-
tion as a cause of action in equity,31 excluded from the seventh
amendment jury trial guarantee. Therefore, in order to hold that
there was a right to jury trial, the Court departed from the purely
historical test.3 2
Justice White, writing for the majority, first set forth the hold-
ings of Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen. He then stated that
the seventh amendment question depends on the nature of the is-
sue to be tried rather than on the character of the overall action.33
The Court footnoted this last statement to aid in determining
whether a particular issue is legal or equitable. The controversial
footnote ten reads:
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is determined by con-
sidering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions;
second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limita-
tions of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive and possibly
30. The only exception was De Pinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323
F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964). De Pinto is criticized in
Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Action, 74 YALE L.J.
725 (1965).
31. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Ross v.
Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Richland v.
Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274, 279 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432,
441 (ND. Iowa 1946). The shareholder derivative suit did not exist in England in
1791 either at common law or in equity. Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit:
Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 980-85 (1957). When the action de-
veloped in England and the United States in the nineteenth century, it emerged as
a wholly equitable action. Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Deriv-
ative Action, 74 YALE L.J. 725, 729-32 (1965).
32. The reason that under the prior practice a court of equity would
dispose of the corporation's legal claim in a derivative suit was that irrepa-
rable injury was threatened because the corporation would not bring the
action at law, and absent equitable determination of standing the stock-
holder could not. Noting that had courts of law recognized the right of the
stockholder to bring such a suit the basis for equitable relief would have
disappeared, Mr. Justice White indicated that the Rules had the same ef-
fect. By making it possible for a legal and an equitable claim to be
brought as parts of the same action, they removed the barrier to a jury
trial of the corporate claim after non-jury trial of the issue of standing.
Since the case was thus to be treated as containing two claims, one equi-
table and one legal, the Seventh Amendment as interpreted in Beacon
Theatres and Dairy Queen required that the legal claim go to the jury.
5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11, at 128.18 (2d ed. 1978). The result reached
and the rationale employed in Ross are criticized in The Supreme Cour, 1969
Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 174-76 (1970); Note, Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Deriva-
tive Suit, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 697, 700-07 (1970).
33. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1970).
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abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult to apply.34
The Court cited no authority for this tripartite test. The first
two criteria, namely, pre-merger custom and remedy sought, are
similar to the historical test. However, traditionally, the relative
abilities of judge and jury did not influence the characterization of
a case as legal or equitable.3 5 Thus, the third criterion created a
34. Id. at 538.
35. At no time in history was the line dividing equity from law-alto-
gether--or even largely-the product of a rational choice between issues
which were better suited to court or to jury trial. There is little to suggest
that the chancellor's initial choice of a procedure borrowed from canon
law reflected a considered rejection of jury trial. Rather, the choice be-
tween law and equity frequently was made upon consideration of other
differences in the procedures of law and equity as they then stood.
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 356-57 (2d ed. 1977). See also Redish, Sev-
enth Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Deci-
sion Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 523-24 (1975). The one exception involves an
action for accounting, when the court will consider the practical limitations of ju-
ries. Historically, in equity, both concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction developed
over matters of account. Concurrent jurisdiction existed even though claims were
legal if the remedy at law was inadequate because of the complicated nature of
the accounts. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 38.25, at 198-99 (2d ed. 1978). In
Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495, 503 (1831), the Supreme Court stated:
In all cases in which an action of account would be the proper remedy at
law .... the jurisdiction of a court of equity is undoubted. But in transac-
tions not of this peculiar character,. . . great complexity at law should in-
terpose,. . in order to induce a court of chancery to exercise jurisdiction.
Thirty-six years later in Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130 (1887),
the Court stated:
The case made by the plaintiff is clearly one of which a court of equity
may take cognizance. The complicated nature of the accounts between
the parties constitutes itself a sufficient ground for going into equity. It
would have been difficult, if not impossible, for a jury to unravel the nu-
merous transactions involved in the settlements between the parties, and
reach a satisfactory conclusion as to the amount of drawbacks to which
Alexander & Co. were entitled on each settlement. Justice could not be
done except by employing the methods of investigation peculiar to courts
of equity.,
Id. at 134 (citations omitted).
More recently, in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), the Supreme
Court recognized the court's discretion to try a case in equity when the accounts
are extraordinarily complex
The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equitable
accounting, like all other equitable remedies, is, as we pointed out in Bea-
con Theatres, the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Consequently,
in order to maintain such a suit on a cause of action cognizable at law, as
this one is, the plaintiff must be able to show that the "accounts between
the parties" are of such a "complicated nature" that only a court of equity
can satisfactorily unravel them. In view of the powers given to District
Courts by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) to appoint masters to as-
sist the jury in those exceptional cases where the legal issues are too com-
plicated for the jury adequately to handle alone, the burden of such a
showing is considerably increased and it will indeed be a rare case in
which it can be met.
Id. at 478 (citing Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887)).
However, mere complication of facts is not a sufficient basis for equity jurisdic-
tion. The facts and accounting must be so complex as to render the legal remedy
inadequate. Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914); United States v. Bitter
1010
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new factor in the determination of whether issues are legal or eq-
uitable.
Interestingly, the Court did not apply the third criterion in
Ross. As a result, federal court judges were left without guidance
in interpreting footnote ten. Based on the vagueness of the tripar-
tite test, several commentators considered the third criterion a
potential bombshell for limiting the right to jury trial.36 On the
other hand, some commentators and judges suggested that the
third criterion be ignored because of lack of clarity.3 7 Without
Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 472-73 (1906); Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249, 1253-
54 (3d Cir. 1969).
36. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrational-
ity of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486, 523-24 (1975); Note, Ross v.
Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112, 128
(1971). Ironically, the majority of articles and critical comments directed at the
Ross decision focused on the great expansion of the right to jury trial because of
Ross. Only in a few of the articles did the author raise the potential constriction
of the right to jury trial through the three criteria in footnote 10. The majority of
commentators either noted the footnote or disregarded it altogether. A sampling
of the articles dealing with the trilogy of Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross
includes: Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irration-
ality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486 (1975); Sower, "Compli-
cated Issues" v. The Right to a Jury Triak A Procedural Remnant in Kentucky Law
Raises Constitutional Problems, 3 N. KY. ST. LF. 173 (1975); Note, Congressional
Provision for Nonjury Trial under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401 (1973);
Note, Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE
L.J. 112 (1971); Comment, From Beacon Theatres to Dairy Queen to Ross: The Sev-
enth Amendmen The Federal Rules, and a Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy, 48 J.
URB. L. 459 (1971). See also 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11, at 128.6-.19,
38.16, at 162.3-.9 (2d ed. 1978); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 92, at 451-54
(3d ed. 1976).
37. Certain lower court cases seemed to disregard the footnote completely.
See Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 344 (2d Cir. 1973); Tights,
Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 340-42 (4th Cir. 1971). One court suggested that it is a
questionable practice for the court to inquire into the practical limitations and
abilities of juries in determining the existence of a right to jury trial. Ochoa v.
American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1972). Judge Friendly dealt di-
rectly with the third prong of the Ross test in United States v. J.B. Williams Co.,
Inc., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974). He argued that
the footnote in Ross v. Bernhard was part of an argument for applying the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial where it had not been recognized
before the merger of law and equity-not a suggestion that a type of stat-
ute which had uniformly been held to carry the right of jury trial should
now be construed to eliminate it.
Id. at 428. See also Sower, "Complicated Issues" v. The Right to a Jury Trial: A
Procedural Remnant in Kentucky Law Raises Constitutional Problems, 3 N. KY.
ST. LF. 173, 190 (1975); 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 406, 415-16 (1973); Note, Monetary
Claims Under Section 1983: The Right to Trial by Jury, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
613, 618-19 (1973); Note, Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh
Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112, 129-33 (1971).
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guidance, the interpretation and the weight to be given the third
criterion were left to the federal court judges.
The immediate effect of Ross was to expand the right to jury
trial to shareholder derivative actions. However, several lower
federal court judges have recently seized upon footnote ten in
Ross to strike jury demands in complex cases. The remainder of
this Comment will analyze these cases in detail and will discuss
whether the current trend is consistent with Supreme Court the-
ory.
THE DISTRICT COURT TREND TO CONSTRICT THE RIGHT TO JURY
TRIAL
Five recent corporate actions deal with the problem of a jury's
ability to competently decide a complicated suit. In re Boise Cas-
cade Securities Litigation, 38 In re United States Financial Securi-
ties Litigation,39 Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc.,40 and ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines,
Inc.41 all sustained motions to strike jury demands based on the
complexity of the facts and issues. However, Radial Lip Machine,
Inc. v. International Carbide Corp.42 refused to adopt the ration-
ale of the other four cases, holding that complexity is not a basis
for eroding the fundamental right to a jury trial. Each court based
its holding on Ross, yet three schools of thought developed over
the proper interpretation of footnote ten in Ross. This section will
explore these five cases in detail.
In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation43 involved a claim for
securities fraud against an acquiring company. The defendant
moved to strike plaintiff's demand for a jury trial. Based on the
complexity of the case, the district court held that the jury de-
mand could be stricken without violating the seventh amend-
ment.44 The facts of the case show why the court was so
concerned about complex issues in a jury trial.
Boise Cascade Corporation acquired West Tacoma Newsprint
Company in November, 1969. In 1971 and 1972, Boise Cascade
wrote down the book value 45 of its assets, causing a drastic reduc-
38. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
39. 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
40. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
41. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
42. 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. IMI. 1977).
43. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
44. Id. at 105.
45. See H. HENN, LAw oF ConpoRAnoNs § 282, at 560 (2d ed. 1970), for an ex-
planation of book value and price manipulation.
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tion in the price of Boise Cascade shares.4 6 Former Newsprint
shareholders alleged various violations of federal and state securi-
ties laws by Boise Cascade, the Boise Cascade accountant, direc-
tors, and officers. 47 Other Newsprint shareholders filed similar
actions after the original suit.4A
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation49 ordered the
West Tacoma Newsprint Cases consolidated for pre-trial purposes
with a case from the Eastern District of Missouri.50 The court ap-
pointed a Special Master to supervise discovery and denied mo-
tions by the defendants to sever the various cases for trial. At the
time of the jury demand, counsel had already expended over
50,000 lawyer hours and had produced in excess of 900,000 docu-
ments.51
The court held that a jury would not be a capable trier of fact
because of the complexity of the factual issues and the time re-
quired to explore those issues.52 The court recognized that Amer-
ican jurisprudence favors jury trials in civil litigation.53 However,
the judge cited Ross for the proposition that the Supreme Court
recognizes certain limits on the use of juries. 54 The district court
explicitly held that the third part of footnote ten in Ross has con-
46. Newsprint shareholder's value went from $75 to $12 per share. In re Boise
Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 101 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
47. Specifically, plaintiffs charged violations of §§ 12(2) and 17(a) of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2) and 77q(a) (1976); §§ 10(b) and 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78m(a) (1976); Rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 21.20.010 (1959), 21.20.430
(1974).
48. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 101 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) (creating the panel).
50. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 101 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 101-03. Each plaintiff had to prove individually a different measure of
reliance. The case involved complicated usury laws and difficult and potential tax
liabilities. Evidence of prior settlement actions brought by the State of California
would be admitted to show the precise amount of the stock write-down. This evi-
dence might raise the possibility of prejudice to the defendants. Finally, the case
involved assets and liabilities in excess of one billion dollars over a period of more
than five years.
53. There can be no doubt that jury trials are favored in civil litigation
in this country. The combination of the Seventh Amendment and the
merger of actions at law and equity into a single civil action under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourages the use of juries to deter-
mine facts.
In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 103-04 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (cit-
ing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1970)).
54. Id. at 104.
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stitutional dimensions and is a limitation on or interpretation of
the seventh amendment.5 5
According to Boise Cascade, the constitutional basis of footnote
ten in Ross rests on the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Fair-
ness must attend the resolution of civil actions. Central to fair-
ness is a capable fact finder. At some point, the complexity of a
case exceeds the jury's ability to decide the case in a capable
manner. The question then arises whether an unqualified fact
finder defeats fairness. 56
The court in Boise Cascade identified two factors dictating
whether a jury should hear a case. First, the jury must represent
a fair cross-section of the community.5 7 Because the Boise Cas-
cade trial could last from four to six months, many employed per-
sons would have been excused from jury service. The court
suggested that the appearance of fairness is diminished, if not
eliminated, when the jury in a commercial action contains jurors
with no exposure to contemporary commercial or business envi-
ronments. 8
The second factor is whether trial to the court would be supe-
rior to trial to a jury.5 9 The court in Boise Cascade found that a
judge could use tools that would be unwieldy for a jury.60 The
tools uniquely available to the judge include: review of daily tran-
scripts, admission of depositions into evidence in place of reading
relevant portions aloud, review of selected portions of testimony
from the reporter's notes, and flexibility in scheduling trial activi-
ties. The court is able to study exhibits in depth and carry on col-
loquies with witnesses, expert and nonexpert alike, in an orderly
and systematic manner.61
The district court found that both factors were present. The
court found that the jury would not represent a cross-section of
the community. The tools available to the court made a trial to
the judge superior to a jury trial. Based on these findings, Boise
Cascade granted defendant's motion to strike jury demand.
In re United States Financial Securities Litigation62 exemplifies
a "complex case."63 The case involved primarily federal securities
law violations, California securities law violations, and common
55. Id. at 105.




60. Id. at 104-05. This inquiry can be criticized on the grounds that in almost
every type of case, the "tools available to the court" will render any trial to the
court superior to a trial by jury.
61. Id. at 104-05.
62. 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
63. The first indicator of the extraordinary complexity of the case is the listing
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law fraud.64 The claims arose out of the bankruptcy of United
States Financial.65 United States Financial's business consisted
primarily of the construction and development of single-family
residences throughout the United States. United States Finan-
cial's stocks and debentures were registered with the Securities
Exchange Commission and traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change.
The underlying issues in the action included inaccuracies in
financial statements, improper accounting standards, and inflation
of income reported and filed by United States Financial. The de-
positions filled 150,000 pages. Over five million documents were
available for discovery. The plaintiffs' Steering Committee identi-
fied nearly 12,000 documents the plaintiff intended to offer into ev-
idence at trial. The court estimated a minimum of 100,000 pages of
documentary evidence at trial.66 The plaintiffs intended to call, in
of counsel prior to the opinion. The list includes at least 45 separate law firms par-
ticipating in the lawsuit.
64. Plaintiffs also asserted violations of Ohio securities laws and certain other
common law claims. In addition to substantive claims, the complaints included al-
legations of vicarious liability, such as conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and the
controlling person doctrine. At the time of the jury trial motion, the total number
of United States Financial cases (including a SEC case) was 18 and the number of
certified classes was five. As stated in the case:
More specifically, the 20 or so individual defendants and the 80-odd corpo-
rate or partnership defendants are accused of eleven different violations
of Section 10(b), five violations of Section 13(a), and violations of other
sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The defendants are also
said to have violated Sections 11, 12(2) and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933.
In addition, common law counts based on negligence, gross negligence,
and malpractice are found in many of the complaints .... Furthermore,
the number of parties asserting claims against the defendants is not lim-
ited to the plaintiffs and the five certified classes. Many of the defendants
have filed cross-claims against one another.
In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 706 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
65. Various plaintiffs filed 10 lawsuits in the Southern District of California
and in four other judicial districts relating to United States Financials collapse. In
1974, the Judicial Panel for Multi-District Litigation ordered all these cases trans-
ferred to the Southern District for coordinated or consolidated pre-trial proceed-
ings. See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 1403 (J.P.M.D.L.
1974).
66. Judge Turrentine graphically explained the breadth of the documentary
evidence:
The time and effort necessary to read and understand 100,000 pages comes
a little into focus when one realizes that such a quantity of paper forms a
stack over forty feet high (as high as a three-story building). In the alter-
native, one could say that such a quantity of paper would completely fill
five large filing cabinets. Or, from a lawyer's perspective, reading those
100,000 pieces of paper would be like sitting down to read the first 90
volumes of the Federal Reporter, 2nd Series-including all the headnotes.
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person or by deposition, at least 241 witnesses. The court esti-
mated a trial length of at least two years.67
In striking the jury demand, the court pointed out that the
United States Supreme Court recognizes the power of the district
court to try complex cases in equity and dispense with a jury
trial.68 The court in United States Financial acknowledged that
prior decisions allowing equity jurisdiction of complex issues in-
volved the determination on the issue of damages as distin-
guished from the issue of liability.69 The court pointed out that
Tights, Inc. v. Stanley7 O distinguished complicated issues of liabil-
ity from complicated issues of damages. Tights recognized that
complex issues might arise during the liability portion of the trial.
United States Financial noted that in Tights, the court reserved
to the United States Supreme Court the question of extending eq-
In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
67. Id. at 708.
68. Id. at 709 (citing Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134
(1887). See note 35 supra. See also F. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have
Good Intentions Gone Awry? (Apr. 1976) (address delivered at The Pound Con-
ference), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 199, 209 (1976).
69. 75 F.R.D. 702, 710 (S.D. Cal. 1977). Prior to the five recent cases currently
under discussion, the rule in Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130
(1887), see note 35 supra, has rarely been implemented. Recent applications are
unclear whether equity accounting jurisdiction applies only to issues of damages
or also to issues of liability. Two cases recognizing equity jurisdiction over ac-
counts never addressed the question whether equity jurisdiction is limited to dam-
ages issues. See Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801 (D. Kan.
1928), ajj'd, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931); Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914
(S.D. Tex. 1972). However, in Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1971),
the court explicitly held that equity accounting jurisdiction extends only to issues
of damages:
However, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the argument that
equity jurisdiction may be invoked because of the complexity and diffi-
culty of issues of liability as distinguished from the complexity of ac-
counting damages.
If the scope of "equitable accounting" is to be expanded to encompass
cases felt to be too complex or esoteric for trial to a jury, we think that
expansion must come from the Supreme Court. We do not construe any
language in the Dairy Queen opinion to sanction this further limitation of
the right to jury trial.
Id. at 340-41.
Furthermore, in Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249 (3d Cir. 1969), the court
stated:
While it is true that equity traditionally has had jurisdiction in actions for
an accounting, it has always been recognized that there may be a suit for
accounting at law and indeed the essential ingredient of equity's jurisdic-
tion has been the complicated nature of the accounting.... There is
nothing on the present record to indicate that the accounting between the
parties in the determination of profits or damages will be so complicated
as to be beyond the power of a jury to determine.
Id. at 1253-54 (emphasis added). See also A.M.F. Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham,
352 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1965); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1964).
70. 441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1971).
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uity jurisdiction to liability issues. 71 However, the United States
Financial court extended equity jurisdiction over accounts to is-
sues of liability, without precedent from the Supreme Court.7 2
The court supplies three general guidelines in determining
whether a case is so complex that equity jurisdiction will attach
and require a bench trial.7 3 First, even though they arise in the
liability portion of a trial, complicated accounting problems are
not generally amenable to jury resolution. However, as required
by Dairy Queen, the issue is not subject to removal from the
jury's province if a Special Master can meaningfully assist the
jury.74 Second, the jury members must be capable of understand-
ing and dealing rationally with the issues of the case. The final
guideline is that an unusually long trial may make extraordinary
demands upon a jury, making it difficult for jurors to function ef-
fectively throughout the trial.
Applying the three guidelines, the court found unequivocally
that the jury was incompetent to try the case. The accounts were
exceedingly complex. The law on liability included federal and
state laws in addition to numerous legal theories. Moreover, the
71. 75 F.R.D. at 710. It is interesting to note that in Tights, the court never
mentioned footnote 10 in Ross. Professor Redish suggests that perhaps the court
failed to notice the footnote. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A
Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486, 524
n.148 (1975).
72. 75 F.R.D. at 710-11. The court cited two lower federal court decisions in
support of the extension. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99
(W.D. Wash. 1976); Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
The court in United States Financial claimed that Ochoa did not limit its reason-
ing to the damages portion of a trial. However, the language in Ochoa is dicta.
Furthermore, in Ochoa, the court acknowledged that courts do inquire into the
practical abilities and limitations of juries, yet questioned whether the inquiry is
proper. Id. at 921-22. Moreover, United States Financial relied upon Boise Cas-
cade which never addressed the issue of traditional equity jurisdiction over ac-
counts. Boise Cascade is cited merely to point out that "at least" one court has
decided that a case is so complex as to warrant striking jury demands. In re
United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 711. The court made no further at-
tempt to thoroughly analyze the extension.
73. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 711.
74. FED. R. Crv. P. 53(b) and 53(e) set forth the function and qualifications of
the Special Master. The Master aids the jury if the issues are so complex and
complicated that laymen would have difficulty in making an adequate determina-
tion if unaided by an informal impartial expert. The Master is used merely as an
expert witness who hears the evidence bearing on the complicated matters. The
Master renders a report on the evidence to the jury. The report is subject to a rul-
ing by the court upon any objections in point of law made at trial. The report is
admissible as evidence of the matters found. See also 5A MooRE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 53.14(2), at 3036 (2d ed. 1978).
1017
trial would be uncommonly long, and jury service of two years is
beyond the jury's practical limitations.7 5 Finally, the court
pointed out the waste of judicial time and unfairness to the plain-
tiffs if the court severed the individual actions and returned them
to their respective districts for jury trials.
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc. 76 involved an elaborate
class action by lyricists and music composers alleging restraint of
trade, copyright violations, monopolization, and antitrust viola-
tions by various entertainment distributors.77 The court sua
sponte raised the issue of jury competence to understand and
render a fair decision in light of the complexity of the issues.
The court's analysis followed United States Financial in apply-
ing the three-pronged Ross test to extend traditional equity ac-
counting jurisdiction. With respect to the pre-merger custom, the
court accepted the consensus that private antitrust actions are le-
gal. The relief sought included five equitable and two legal reme-
dies.78 Thus, the first two criteria favored a finding that the jury is
the proper trier of fact. However, the court treated the third crite-
rion of the practical abilities and limitations of the jury as disposi-
tive, relying upon United States Financial and Boise Cascade.79
The court compared the factual issues in Bernstein to the facts
75. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 714. The court did not
include the Boise Cascade argument that a true cross-section of the community
could not be represented on the jury.
76. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
77. At the time of the motion, 65 named plaintiffs and 11 defendants remained
in the action. Seven major law firms represented the parties. The size of the class
constituted 400 to 900 members. Plaintiffs intended to call 15 witnesses and offer
more than 550 exhibits. Defendants intended to call 100 witnesses and pre-marked
650 exhibits for introduction at trial. More than 70 depositions had been taken.
The court estimated the minimum length of trial as to the plaintiffs alone at four
months. Factually, the interrelationships between the parties were so varied and
complex that almost no statement could be made about everyone similarly in-
volved. Each class member had to prove his/her own injury and damages sepa-
rately and each had to do so individually with respect to each contract made with
each defendant. The court stated:
In addition, if, as appears likely, it is necessary to prove what percentage
of the performance fees each named plaintiff would have received on each
separate contract but for the conspiracy, plaintiffs will have to call each
named plaintiff (65), introduce each of the contracts (1,050) by which they
claim they were injured, and give proof on the 580 individual contract ne-
gotiations involved.
Id. at 63.
78. The defendants attempted to categorize the prayer for money damages as
"equitable restitution." The court refused to accept this characterization stating:
[I]t stretches the definition of equitable restitution and rejects established
precedent unnecessarily to characterize as the prevention of "unjust en-
richment" what is in reality an award of "damages to which plaintiff is le-
gally entitled" if the allegations are upheld.
Id. at 67.
79. Id. at 69.
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and issues that were found extraordinarily complex in United
States Financial and Boise Cascade. The court first found that a
trial of at least four months precluded empanelling a representa-
tive jury.80 Second, although antitrust suits are generally within
the competence of juries, the complexity of the relationships be-
tween the parties in Bernstein rendered the action beyond the
ability and competence of any jury to understand and decide.8 '
Third, severance of one defendant does not abate the complexity.
Moreover, separate jury trials would probably result in separate
and inconsistent verdicts, a severe injustice under the facts of the
case.82 Finally, the special problems presented by the nature of
the damages claimed, standing alone, would render the case unfit
for jury determination.83
The court recognized two additional requirements. First, the
Supreme Court requires something more than mere complexity
to justify recourse to equity. The necessity for an accounting sat-
isfies that requirement.84 The court found the requirement met in
Bernstein without any explanation. Additionally, the possibility
of referral to a Special Master must be rejected before a court can
strike a jury demand on the basis of complexity.8 5 The court de-
termined that even though a Special Master might aid in the ac-
counting issue, the damages and liability issues were too complex
for the jury. As a result, the court granted defendant's motion to
strike jury demand.86
The plaintiffs in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International
Business Machines Corp.87 (IBM) brought an action for monopoli-
zation of various markets in the computer industry. After a five-
month jury trial88 and nineteen days of deadlocked deliberations,
80. Id. at 70.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 71.
84. Id. at 70 (citing Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801, 804
(D. Kan. 1928), affd, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931)); In re United States Fin. Sec. Liti-
gation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
85. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.RD. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
86. The court stated that to hold that a jury trial is required would be to hold
that the seventh amendment gives a single party at its choice the right to an irra-
tional verdict. Id. at 71.
87. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
88. Before jury selection, the defendant moved to strike plaintiff's jury de-
mand on the ground the issues were too complex for a jury to decide fairly. The
court denied the motion at that time. Because the action ended in a mistrial, the
court felt the question deserved further consideration.
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the court declared a mistrial.8 9 The court granted IBM's motion
for a directed verdict and made a separate ruling, striking the jury
demand, in the event of a remand for trial.90
Resolution of the monopolization allegations required an under-
standing of a vast amount of advanced computer technology and
sophisticated financial principles.9 ' The case involved only a sin-
gle defendant and a single plaintiff. However, the acts that plain-
tiff alleged as anti-competitive and predatory were extremely
complex. 92 In ruling on the jury demand, the court recognized
that equity jurisdiction exists when the litigation is very com-
plex.93 However, mere complication of facts alone is not a basis
for equity jurisdiction.9 4 As in Bermrtein, the court stated that the
first two Ross factors of pre-merger custom and remedy sought
are traditionally regarded as legal in antitrust actions. Even so,
the third factor of the practical abilities and limitations of jurors
led the court to conclude that this case was equitable. The court
found that the case involved more than complicated facts.9 5 The
accounting and especially the engineering concepts were far be-
yond the experience and understanding of an ordinary jury.96
The court questioned whether the jury represented a true
cross-section of the community. After excuses, only twenty-nine
candidates remained from which fourteen jurors were to be se-
lected. Only one juror had even limited technical education. The
jurors probably represented a random cross-section of those who
could afford to spend such an extended amount of time sitting on
the jury.97
89. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423, 426 (N.D. Cal 1978).
90. Id. at 444.
91. The parties called 87 witnesses whose testimony filled more than 19,000
pages of transcript. More than 2,300 exhibits were admitted into evidence.
92. These included nondisclosure of interface information; unfair advantage
with regard to IBM's fixed-term leasing plan; installation of a "disk drive" which
assured use of IBM parts; new attachment strategies of disk drives to computer
systems, communication control units, and central processing units. Each "act"
also included allegations of unfair pricing.
93. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citing Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R., 120
U.S. 130 (1887)). See note 35 supra.
94. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citing United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200
U.S. 451 (1906)); Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633 (1914). See note 35 supra.
95. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458
F. Supp. 423, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
96. Id.
97. The case was submitted to 11 jurors. The six men and five women on the
jury ranged in age from 32 years to 65 years, with the majority over 50. Several of
the jurors were housewives. Those employed worked at jobs where they could be
replaced, but where neither their jobs nor their incomes were in jeopardy. The
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Further, the court pointed out that the posture of the case
posed a different problem from that confronting the court in Boise
Cascade, United States Financial, or Bernstein. In those cases,
each court's decision to strike the jury was based on experience
as a trial court in evaluating the complexity of the case. Even so,
the conclusion of jury incompetence was somewhat speculative. 98
However, in ILC Peripherals, the court based the decision to
strike the jury on observations during the five-month trial. The
jurors were diligent and conscientious, but their past experience
did not prepare them to decide a case involving technical ques-
tions.9 9 The fact that the first jury trial ended in a mistrial was an
court stated that it was understandable that people with such backgrounds would
have trouble applying concepts like cross-elasticity of supply and demand, market
share and market power, reverse engineering, product interface manipulation, ex-
clusionary leasing, entrepreneurial subsidiaries, subordinated debentures, stock
options, and modeling. Id. at 448.
98. Empirical data on jury performance is sparse. However, one major study
of the American jury system does exist. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JuRY (1966). It is interesting that none of the courts dealing with jury competence
cited the Kalven and Zeisel study. The authors state that most of the unrest over
the jury today is limited to civil trials by jury. The implicit assumption is that jury
determinations will be different from judge determinations in the same case. Id.
at9.
The study deals mainly with criminal trial juries. However, with respect to civil
juries, the authors found that the jury and judge were in agreement 78% of the
time. The agreement is roughly the same whether the trial is criminal or civil. Id.
at 64.
The study presents the judge-jury disagreement figures for the easy and the dif-
ficult cases. The hypothesis is that if the jury had any propensity to misunder-
stand the case, it would be more likely to disagree with the judge. Id. at 157. The
result refuted the hypothesis that the jury does not understand. There was virtu-
ally no difference between the frequency of disagreement whether the case was
easy or difficult. Id. (This part of the study was based on criminal trials.)
The conclusion drawn from the Kalven and Zeisel study is that much more em-
pirical research is necessary to determine whether trial to a judge is superior to
jury trial in complex civil litigation. The courts striking jury demands do not base
jury incompetence upon empirical data. Rather, the judges base the decision sim-
ply upon their experience gained from the bench. The study tends to show that
the claim that a jury will decide differently from the judge is without support.
More research is necessary before judges can validly claim that issues are too
complex for jury determination.
99. When asked by the court whether a case of this type should be
tried to a jury, the foreman of the jury said, "If you can find a jury that's
both a computer technician, a lawyer, an economist, knows all about that
stuff, yes, I think you could have a qualified jury, but we don't know any-
thing about that." Several of the other jurors indicated that they thought
that the major stumbling block was the requirement that the verdict be
unanimous. When they were questioned after the trial, most of the jurors
indicated that they thought a complex antitrust case like this one should
be tried to the court.
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important factor in striking the jury demand in ILC Peripherals.
The court stated that perhaps jury trials should not be eliminated
completely in complex antitrust litigation. However, if the first
trial results in a mistrial, the system and the parties are better
served by a trial to the court.10 0 The curtailment of the right to a
jury trial must be scrutinized with utmost care.' 0 ' However, the
court held that the magnitude and complexity of the issues ren-
dered the issues beyond the ability of any jury to understand and
decide rationally. 0 2
The identical question of the right to a jury trial in complex liti-
gation arose in Radial Lip Machine, Inc. v. International Carbide
Corp.'0 3 However, the court reached the opposite conclusion in
Radial Lip and severely criticized Boise Cascade.
Radial Lip involved an action for patent and trademark in-
fringement and breach of contract. The defendant counter-
claimed for declaratory relief and moved for a jury trial. Plaintiff
moved to strike the defendant's jury demand. The parties in-
cluded three corporations involved in the development and mar-
keting of a "radial lip" drill, used in the metal cutting industry.
The factual background revealed a series of corporate transac-
tions transferring patent rights and creating numerous contrac-
tual obligations between the parties. Radial Lip ultimately fied a
complaint alleging that the defendants violated federal trademark
and patent laws, engaged in unfair competition, and violated cer-
tain Illinois statutes.104 Radial Lip sought an injunction, an ac-
counting, and damages. The defendants counterclaimed,
requesting declaratory and equitable relief and damages.10S
In the motion to strike jury demand, plaintiff argued that be-
cause of the complexity of the case, a bench trial would be fairer
and more expeditious than a jury trial. Plaintiff relied on footnote
ten in Ross and urged the court to adopt Boise Cascade.0 6 The
court refused to adopt the plaintiff's position.
The Radial Lip cotrt saw two possible interpretations of foot-
note ten. First, the Supreme Court in Ross may have intended
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423, 447-48 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
100. Id. at 448.
101. Id. at 445.
102. Id. ILC Peripherals never addressed the issue of whether equity account-
ing jurisdiction extends to liability issues. The court bypassed the question by fol-
lowing the basic rationale of United States Financial.
103. 76 F.RLD. 224 (N.D. IMI. 1977).
104. Id. at 225.
105. Id.
106. Plaintiff claimed that footnote 10 in Ross is of constitutional dimension and
is a limitation on or interpretation of the seventh amendment.
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that federal courts inquire into jury competence only as part of
the threshold determination of whether an issue is legal or equi-
table in nature. Once the Ross three-pronged analysis character-
izes an issue as legal, all future cases with the same issue trigger
the same result. 07
A second interpretation is that the practical limitations of juries
operate as a general exception to the seventh amendment. Jury
competence is an open question in every lawsuit and depends on
the complexity of the specific problems presented rather than on
the general nature of the legal issues involved. 08 Radial Lip re-
fused to accept the second interpretation. The court held that
footnote ten contemplates a general analysis of the problems typi-
cally presented by a claim, not a case-by-case analysis of the com-
plexity of the litigation. 109
The court also disagreed with Boise Cascade over another is-
sue. In Radial Lip, the plaintiff argued for the application of foot-
note ten in respect to complexity of issues. The plaintiff urged
that in an extraordinary case the complexity of the issues may be
so great that only a court of equity can unravel the issues.11 0 The
court in Radial Lip acknowledged that the Supreme Court in
Dairy Queen recognized the exception of equity accounting juris-
diction; however, the court maintained that the exception is a nar-
107. Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 227
(N.D. Ill. 1977).
108. Id.
109. We cannot read the Ross and Boise decisions as creating such a
broad exception to the Seventh Amendment. We believe, in accordance
with the first interpretation of Ross described above, that federal courts
should only inquire into the competence of juries to decide "legal" issues
when they initially examine the nature of the issues raised by a claim.
The three Ross criteria are guides for determining whether a claim typi-
cally has a sufficient quantum of legal elements so that it must be tried to
a jury .... The portion of the Ross test which weighs the practical abili-
ties and limitations of juries contemplates a general analysis of the
problems typically presented by those claims, not a specific case-by-case
analysis of the complexity of the litigation. Otherwise, the courts would
be forced to apply an unmanageable standard of complexity in every case
before them. The likely result would be a dilution of the right to jury trial.
Id. at 227-28.
It is ironic that Ross may now stand for the dilution of the right to jury trial
when many early critics perceived it as expanding the right without limits. See
note 36 supra.
110. Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 228
(NJD. Ill. 1977). See note 35 supra.
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row one. 1 Radial Lip interpreted Dairy Queen to allow equity
jurisdiction as to damages if the issues are extraordinarily com-
plex, but not as to liability.112
Therefore, Radial Lip interprets Ross as requiring a two-tier
analysis. First, the court uses footnote ten to make an initial de-
termination of whether an issue is legal or equitable. Second, if
the issue is legal, the court may apply traditional equity account-
ing jurisdiction as to the damages issues. However, Dairy Queen
requires an exceptional showing of complexity to warrant equity
jurisdiction over even the damages issues. Based on this analy-
sis, the court held that the plaintiff failed to identify any complex
accounting issues to justify equity jurisdiction. Plaintiff analyzed
only the factual and liability issues presented and failed to make
the exceptional showing required by Dairy Queen. As a result,
the court denied the motion to strike jury demand.11 3
ANALYSIS
Three schools of thought have developed over the proper inter-
pretation of footnote ten in Ross. Boise Cascade maintains that
the third part of footnote ten has constitutional dimensions. The
Boise Cascade court sees the third criterion as a limit to the sev-
enth amendment right to jury trial. United States Financial, ILC
Peripherals, and Bernstein do not go quite so far. These courts
contend that footnote ten intended to reemphasize the practical
abilities and limitations of the jury in any case involving complex
facts and issues. Finally, Radial Lip contends that Ross aids only
in the initial determination of whether an issue is legal or equita-
ble. The three Ross factors determine the susceptibility of a
claim to a trial by jury. If the action involves legal issues, the
court may again look at the complexity and decide whether the
accounting for damages is too complex for a jury to unravel. Ra-
dial Lip uses a two-tier analysis in contrast to the other cases
which combine the two steps into one inquiry.
The difference of opinion in the decisions is twofold. First, the
courts disagree whether equity accounting jurisdiction is limited
111. Radical Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 228
(N). Ill. 1977). See note 35 supra.
112. Radical Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 228
(N.D. IlM. 1977). See note 69 supra.
113. In addition, the court found that even if equitable accounting could be jus-
tified by the complexity of liability issues alone, this case did not surpass the lim-
its of jury competence. For example, the case involved only two competing
corporations, the parties estimated a trial length of only three weeks, the number
of documents was not large, and the validity of the radial lip patent was undis-
puted. Thus, the court would uphold the demand even if based on the Boise Cas-
cade criteria and rationale.
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to damages issues or includes liability issues. Second, the courts
disagree whether footnote ten applies in determining complexity
with regard to equity accounting jurisdiction or only to the initial
determination whether an issue is legal or equitable.
The split of opinion whether equity jurisdiction attaches to lia-
bility issues as well as damages issues looms large. The four deci-
sions striking jury demand either gloss over or deal
unsatisfactorily with the traditional equity accounting jurisdiction
issue. Even so, the courts hold that complexity of liability issues
warrants equity jurisdiction and denial of jury trial. The courts
seize upon the third criterion in footnote ten to bolster the equity
jurisdiction contention. However, the courts have combined two
separate doctrines into one, thereby confusing each doctrine.
Even if equity accounting jurisdiction includes liability issues,
the courts still disagree whether the Supreme Court intended
footnote ten to apply in determining equity accounting jurisdic-
tion. Most of the lower court cases applying the Ross footnote do
not involve complex business litigation.114 As a result, the third
criterion of practical abilities and limitations of the jury is not as
important a consideration as in the five commercial suits. The
question of equity accounting jurisdiction based on complexity
never arises. Yet, the courts still apply footnote ten in deciding
the initial question of whether an issue is legal or equitable in na-
ture. Therefore, many of the courts follow the Radial Lip analy-
sis that footnote ten applies only to the initial determination
rather than to the determination of equity accounting jurisdic-
tion.115 The courts inquire in general whether a jury could com-
petently understand that particular issue.
Minnis v. International Union, UAW116 applied the Ross test in
an action by an employee against the union for failure to provide
fair representation. The Minnis court found that the pre-merger
custom and remedy sought pointed to legal jurisdiction. Then the
court found that, in general, juries are suitable for deciding the
exact issue presented. A properly instructed jury could ade-
quately perform its duty of finding facts and making a damages
114. See, e.g., Minnis v. International Union, UAW, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. J.B. Williams Co., Inc., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974); Farmers-Peo-
ples Bank v. United States, 477 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1973); Dawson v. Contractors
Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D.
348 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
115. See cases cited note 114 supra.
116. 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975). 1025
award in an action for failure to provide fair representation.1 17
Another case following Radial Lip is Cleverly v. Western Elec-
tric Co.,118 an action under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA). The complaint prayed for reinstatement,
attorneys' fees and costs, back pay, and liquidated damages. The
court first held that reinstatement and attorneys' fees and costs
are clearly equitable. Next, the court separately analyzed the is-
sues of back pay and liquidated damages as required by Ross."iD
With respect to both issues, the court found the computations of
damages well within the practical abilities of a jury.12 °
In Dawson v. Contractors Transport Corp.,121 the dissenting
judge maintained that Ross did not intend to limit the right to
jury trial. Rather, Ross intended to extend the right to a class of
plaintiffs who prior to merger would not have had the right to a
jury trial.122 Judge Friendly expressed a similar view in United
States v. J.B. Williams Co., Inc.123 Judge Friendly claimed that
footnote ten was part of an argument for applying the seventh
amendment right to jury trial where it had not been recognized
before merger. The Supreme Court did not intend to suggest that
a type of statute which had uniformly been held to carry the right
to jury trial should now be construed to eliminate that right.124
An interesting case upholding the right to jury trial is Jones v.
Orenstein.25 Jones involved securities violations and at first
glance appears to rely upon the Boise Cascade analysis. How-
ever, upon closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that the analysis
is also similar to Radial Lip.
117. Id. at 852-53. See also Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D.
Mich. 1974). Rowan involved an action by union members against their employer
for breach of a collective bargaining agreement and against the union for breach of
duty to fairly represent union members. The court held that although the facts
may have been somewhat complex, they were no more complicated than antitrust
and shareholder derivative suits which have been found suitable for jury determi-
nation.
118. 69 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
119. The court cited footnote 10 and stated: "Because the right to jury trial de-
pends on the issues in controversy rather than on the character of the overall ac-
tion as noted above, the conclusions reached with respect to the different claims
for relief made may differ. Therefore, each claim will be considered indepen-
dently." Id. at 350 (emphasis added). The italicized portion parallels the analysis
employed in Radial Lip, in contrast to the Boise Cascade practice of looking at
the overall complexity of the action.
120. Again, the court looked more to the general abilities of a jury than to the
specific facts in the case which could be labeled complex. See also Farmers-Peo-
ples Bank v. United States, 477 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1973); Fellows v. Medford Corp.,
431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Ore. 1977).
121. 467 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Fahy, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 736.
123. 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
124. Id. at 428.
125. 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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The Jones court initially determined that federal antitrust pro-
visions are legal in nature and that plaintiff had a right to a jury
trial.126 The court then cited Ross as authority that the court in
its discretion could quash plaintiffs jury demand on the basis of
the limitations of a jury's practical abilities.127 The court com-
pared the complex issues in Jones to those in Boise Cascade, con-
cluding that a jury could competently decide the case. 12 8
Thus, the decision in Jones consisted of a hybrid analysis. The
court followed Radial Lip in making the initial determination
that the issues are legal. Radial Lip maintains that after the ini-
tial determination, the court may look to complexity in deciding
whether equity accounting jurisdiction exists with regard to dam-
ages issues. However, in Jones, the court looked at complexity
but relied upon Boise Cascade rather than working through the
law of equity accounting jurisdiction. In sum, the court used a
two-tier analysis, yet followed neither Radial Lip nor Boise Cas-
cade.129
A probing question at this juncture is: What guidance has the
United States Supreme Court supplied since Ross with respect to
the right to jury trial? Three Supreme Court decisions deal with
the right to jury trial. However, only one decision directly ad-
dresses footnote ten in Ross.130 In Curtis v. Loether,131 the issue
126. Id. at 606.
127. Id.
128. Id. In Jones, the court estimated trial length at six to eight weeks as com-
pared to four to six months in Boise Cascade. In addition, the documentary evi-
dence was manageable and thus the special tools available to the court did not
make trial to the judge superior to jury trial
129. The conflicting analyses in Jones lend credence to the claim that courts
cannot agree on how to interpret Ross.
130. Two of the decisions are not directly on point. The first, Atlas Roofing Co.,
Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), in-
volved a cause of action under OSHA. The Court held that the seventh amend-
ment does not prevent Congress from assigning to an administrative agency the
task of adjudicating violations of the Act. when Congress creates a "new statutory
right," it can restrict the right to jury trial. Id. at 459-61. See also NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Second, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978), addressed the issue of whether there is a right to jury trial in private civil
actions for lost wages under ADEA. The Supreme Court never reached the consti-
tutional question, holding that the statute on its face demonstrated the intent to
grant such a right. (The circuit court opinion did directly deal with the constitu-
tional issue. The court employed the Ross test stating that the computation of
back wages is not beyond the practical capabilities of a jury. 549 F.2d 950, 954 (4th
Cir. 1977)). Only Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), directly addresses footnote
10 in Ross.
131. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
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was whether section 812 of the Civil Rights Act132 or the seventh
amendment required a jury trial upon demand in an action for
damages and injunctive relief. The Court pointed out that neither
the statute on its face nor the legislative history clearly indicated
whether a jury trial was required. Therefore, the Court based its
opinion on an analysis of the seventh amendment. The Court
held that a damages action under section 812 is an action to en-
force legal rights.133 The Court worked through the first two crite-
ria in footnote ten. The cause of action is analogous to a number
of tort actions recognized at common law. More importantly, the
Court found that the remedy sought is the traditional form of re-
lief offered in the courts of law.134 The Supreme Court upheld the
right of jury trial without once mentioning the practical abilities
and limitations of the jury.135
132. Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976), autho-
rizes private plaintiffs to bring civil actions to redress violations of Title VIII, the
fair housing provisions of the Act.
133. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (citing Ross v. Bernhard and
Dairy Queen; Inc. v. Wood).
134. Id. at 195-96.
135. The only possible reference to the third criterion is the Court's discussion
of possible jury prejudice:
We recognize, too, the possibility that jury prejudice may deprive a victim
of discrimination of the verdict to which he or she is entitled. Of course,
the trial judge's power to direct a verdict, to grant judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, or to grant a new trial provides substantial protection
against this risk, and respondents' suggestion that jury trials will expose a
broader segment of the populace to the example of the federal civil rights
laws in operation has some force. More fundamentally, however, these
considerations are insufficient to overcome the clear command of the Sev-
enth Amendment.
Id. at 198.
Various lower court decisions attempt to interpret the Supreme Court's failure
in Curtis to discuss the third criterion in footnote 10. The first, Barber v. Kim-
brell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978), involved the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976). Barber interpreted the language in Curtis to suggest
two tests in determining whether an action based on a federal statute entails a
constitutional right to jury trial. First, are the rights and duties created by statute
analogous to rights and duties historically comprehended by the common law?
Second, are the remedies sought legal rather than equitable in nature? In a foot-
note, the district court stated that Ross suggested the third test of the practical
abilities and limitations of juries; however, since the Court in Curtis did not reiter-
ate the third test, the test's continued vitality is in doubt. Barber v. Kimbrell's,
Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 225 n.25 (4th Cir. 1978).
Furthermore, Van Ermen v. Schmidt, 374 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Wis. 1974), also
casts doubt upon the continued vitality of the third criterion in light of Curtis. Van
Ermen interpreted Curtis as holding that the nature of the relief sought is the
most important test. Id. at 1074. The consideration of jury prejudice in Curtis ap-
peared to be directed to interpretation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
not to jury limitations in the seventh amendment context. Id. at n.9. Van Ermen
viewed the third Ross standard as a reaffirmation of the traditional common law
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The recent trend to emphasize the Ross footnote is misplaced
for three reasons. First, the Ross Court never applied the third
criterion to the facts of the case. A shareholder derivative suit
based on alleged violations of the Investment Company Act of
1940136 inherently involves issues of some complexity. Yet the
Court never addressed the issue of jury competency.137 Second,
the Ross Court makes no inquiry into the traditional concurrent
equity jurisdiction of accounts even though the plaintiffs re-
quested that the defendants account for and pay the corporation
for their profits, gains, and losses. This tends to support the claim
that the Supreme Court did not intend to limit access to jury tri-
als.138 Lastly, the most recent Supreme Court decision citing and
applying footnote ten in Ross did not mention the practical abili-
ties and limitations factor.139
If the Ross test and equity accounting jurisdiction are sepa-
rated, major policy considerations militate against striking jury
demands. One consideration is that juries traditionally have
coped with complex cases in areas where the courts are currently
striking demands. An example is patent litigation. The original
patent act in 1790 required that juries assess the amount of dam-
ages. 40 It was not until 1819 that equitable relief became avail-
practice of equity taking jurisdiction where transactions between parties were too
complex for jury determination. Id. at 1075. The issues presented in Van Ermen
were no different from issues common to tort actions typically tried before a jury.
The issues were much less complex than those in Ross, which did not even trigger
discussion of jury abilities in the Supreme Court's decision. Therefore, without
more guidance from the Supreme Court, the judge in Van Ermen refused to ele-
vate risk of jury prejudice to a determinant of seventh amendment protection. Id.
at 1075-76.
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-21 (1976).
137. This lends credence to Radial Lip's analysis in two respects. First, the
court should look only generally to jury limitations in the initial inquiry and not as
they relate specifically to the facts before the court. Second, the Court did not in-
tend to limit the use of juries through its opinion in Ross. Issues involved in
shareholder derivative actions are suitable for jury determination, and therefore
no further inquiry into jury limitations is necessary.
138. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court never combined the dis-
cussion of Ross with a discussion of equity jurisdiction over accounts involving
complex facts and issues.
139. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
140. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109. This statute was repealed and
replaced by a new act in 1793. The new law dropped the specific reference to jury
trial, but provided that damages were to be recovered "in an action on the case," a
common law remedy. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318. The specification
of recovery by "action on the case" was retained until the Patent Act of 1952 sub-
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able.141 Jury trials in patent cases are rooted in history, and
limiting the right to jury trial is a new development in the law.142
Another consideration is the split of authority over whether eq-
uity jurisdiction over accounts is limited to the damages issue as
opposed to the liability issue. None of the courts striking the jury
demand adequately analyzed the question.143 If, however, the
Supreme Court held that equity jurisdiction over accounts did ex-
tend to both liability and damages issues, the conflict with Ross
can be reconciled. The court would initially employ the Ross test
to determine if the issue was equitable or legal, taking into con-
sideration the limitations of juries in general to try the type of is-
sue before the court. If the issue is legal, then the equity
accounting analysis comes into play. However, courts must heed
the admonitions in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen that only
the rare case is complex enough to warrant equity jurisdiction.
A final policy consideration is the fact that judges must deter-
mine complexity on an ad hoc basis. None of the courts cited any
empirical data supporting their claims of jury incompetence. The
closest empirical data was the fact of the mistrial in ILC Peripher-
als. The court drew upon tangible evidence of jury incompetence
rather than on intuitive feeling based on experience gained while
on the bench. 44
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment is not to debate the advisability
of juries in complex civil litigation. The use of juries obviously
delays the system and increases the possibility of waste because
of mistrials. The current trend to limit the use of juries in com-
plex litigation may be desirable and may in fact be necessary.
However, the lower federal courts are achieving the limitation
based on vague and tenuous theories. A split among the jurisdic-
tions has resulted from differing interpretations of the same
Supreme Court decision. Until the United States Supreme Court
supplies guidance regarding the interpretation of footnote ten in
stituted the phrase "civil action" to reflect the merger of law and equity in the fed-
eral courts. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1976).
141. See Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 283
(1976)).
142. See the historical discussion of trial by jury in patent actions in Tights,
Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 342-44 (4th Cir. 1971). A similar argument can be made
with respect to the copyright issues in Bernstein.
143. Boise Cascade never dealt with equity accounting jurisdiction. United
States Financial relied on the dicta in Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914
(S.D. Tex. 1972), and on Boise Cascade. Boise Cascade, Bernstein, and ILC Per-
ipherals cite the same cases as Radial Lip and reach opposite conclusions.
144. See note 98 supra.
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Ross, the current split and the growing trend to limit jury trials
will inevitably continue. Clarification of the proper weight to be
given the criterion of the practical abilities and limitations of a
jury is necessary. Furthermore, the Supreme Court must clarify
the interplay between footnote ten in Ross and equity jurisdiction
over accounts in complex cases. Finally, guidance is needed as to
the scope of equity jurisdiction over issues of liability. Until then,
practitioners will continue to file motions to strike jury trial. In
the meantime, parties are being denied the fundamental right to a
jury trial.
The seventh amendment to the Constitution guarantees the
right to trial by jury in civil actions of a legal nature. The United
States Supreme Court developed the historical test to assure the
fundamental right to a jury trial in actions at law. However, the
merger of law and equity caused the Supreme Court to reevalu-
ate the purely historical test in light of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In Ross v. Bernhard, the Supreme Court expanded the right to
jury trial in an action previously considered equitable in nature.
The Court set forth a three-pronged test in footnote ten to aid in
determining whether an issue is legal or equitable. Footnote ten
in Ross was not intended to be a limitation on the right to a jury
trial.
Furthermore, the third criterion of the practical limitations and
abilities of the jury is not of constitutional dimensions. The only
two Supreme Court decisions applying the footnote have not dis-
cussed the third standard. Moreover, in both Ross v. Bernhard
and Curtis v. Loether the Court used the footnote to extend rather
than to contract the right to jury trial.
Courts may inquire into the complexity of issues with respect
to the traditional common law practice of equity taking jurisdic-
tion over complicated accounts. However, at most, the third crite-
rion reaffirmed traditional equity jurisdiction over accounts as
explained in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood. The traditional limita-
tions of extreme complexity and resort to special masters still ex-
ist. Only rare cases fall into traditional equity jurisdiction over
accounts. In addition, the Supreme Court has yet to declare
whether equity accounting jurisdiction is limited to issues of dam-
ages or extends to issues of liability as well.
Radial Lip Machine, Inc. v. International Carbide Corp. stands
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alone in upholding the right to jury trial as a fundamental right
not to be diluted by issues of complexity. However, the analysis
in Radial Lip is consistent with Supreme Court theory. The
other recent cases have struck jury demands in a manner unin-
tended by the Supreme Court. Guidance from the Supreme
Court is needed in order to ensure that the new trend of striking
jury demands in complex cases will not lead to erosion of the
right to jury trial in all civil actions.
TiNA MARIE PIVONKA
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